By Rev. Baden Powell
The celebrity of Hobbes depends almost entirely Hobbes. oil his
metaphysical, moral, and political writings (1642-78). His speculations on
physical as well iw theological subjects evince little philosophical enlargement
of ideas, andare conceived much in the formal scholastic spirit then prevalent.
Yet the increasing influence of more positive principles may be traced in the
precision of his conceptions on many 1)oints of philosophical inquiry, and his
assertion of unlimited freedom of opinion is indicative of the oipirit of
progress. In regard to higher subjects, he certainly ap- His theological pears
to evince a clear appreciation of the value views. of the Baconian maxim
distinctive of the provinces of reason and of faith; 11 Dignius credere cluftin
scire." In his most celebrated work (especially in the rIkupters on
religion in general, and that entitled I Rohault's ,Physics," pt. 1. c.
10.lie died 1675. so HISTORICAL SKETCH. [ESSAY 1. De Civitate Christiaii&")
1, his discussion On these subjects* almost wholly consists of formal dogmati
". expositions in the most literal sense of the accepted creed. In one
passage indeed, he introduces a caution against mixing up phy8ical with
religious doctrines; but in the sequel it appears that this refers only to
guarding against transubstantiation. He supports at length the received
evidential argument from miracles, exactly in the for al manner of theologians,
as the only proof of a Divine revelation; thougli admitting the qualifying
appeal to internal evidence of the worthiness of the doc- trine.2 Physical In
the physical portion of his 11 Elementa Philo views. sophise " be evinces
in general little advance beyond the ideas of the age; though, on some points, a
singularity of opinion or expression strikes us. Thus, he expressly maintains
that opinions respecting the magnitude or the or~g,~n of the universe, ought
properly to be left to theological authorities to Leviathan, ch. xiv. and
cb.xxxiii. Ibid. ch.xii. and ch. xxxvii. I ZMMAT 1. § U.] HOMES. 81 docide.1
And on similax questions appeals to the authority of Scripture supported by that
of miracles, the custom8 of our count.ry and the reverence due to the laws.2 In
one passage, indeed, speaking of the interpretaflon of some paxts of. Scripture,
he ventures so far as to affirm that we must not adopt too literal a sense; an
in the i4stance of the a;sertions of the immo- bility of the earth and the like;
observing that the object of revelation is not to teach philosophy, but
religious faith and duty.3 . Ile evinces a just discrimination with respect to
the popular prejudice against s~cond causes, asserthig distinctly on the
contrary, that 11 ignorance I T. llobbesN "Opera Omnla Philos." Amst.
1678; "Elern. PhIlos." P. 204. I Ibid. p. 205. 11 Qumstiones igitur de
infinito et Leterno sciens pra~ tereo, contentus eh doctrina circa mund!
magnitudinern et originern quam suaserint Scripturm sacrae, et quae illas
conflrmat miraculorum fama, et mos patrius, et legum reverentia debits." 1
11 Argumenta qum a formula dictionis surnantur, firma non esse: Quoties enim
loquitur Scriptura sacra de terra ut immobill, 'quam. lainen philosophl hodie
fere onmes moveri censent signis evidentissi- nds? Scriptura sacra est a
prophetis et apostolis ad docendum non philosophlarn (quam ad exercitium
rationis naturalis contemplationibus (11.1)utationibusque hominurn reliquit
Deus), sed pietatem et salutis &,ternve viam. "-Leviathan, c. viii. p.
41, 82 HISTORICAL SKETCH. 11 of second causes makes men fear some inv,Sib~ ' C4
agent like the gods of the Gentiles; but the inv iou of them leads us to a God
eternal, iw m 96 figat B , 0 and omnipotent," and he pursues the argument
show that this ignorance of second causes conspiri with certain common
prejudices, as those relating ffuPposed spiritual and supernatuxal beings, and t
" --+,,ral source of all corrupt and supe like, are odtious forms of
religion.1 But again, as to the ground of belief in revelatio ows, cc we have no
cert(vin knowledge of he av of 1-t trust the holy men of God, 64 trutil 01 OCKIP
V~ st church, succeeding one another, from the time 66 those who saw the
wondrous works of Almigh 11 God in the flesh." Upon the whole what
surprises us is -that aa Mm professing theological views so little distinguisha
from the most orthodox creed of his clay, sho have been obnoxious to charges of
scepticism even of atheism, did we not know how liberally tho, I The same
argument is more expanded in his 11 Leviathan," P. 55. 2 Human Nature* c.
iL FS8AY I. § 11-1 SIR T. BROWNE. 83 epithets are bestowed from mere personal
or party animosity. The publication of Sir T. Browne's 11 Inquiry into Vulgar
and common Errors " (1646) has been justly commented I on as, a remarkable
case of the advanchig influence of the enlightenment of the age on a mind
previously given to superstition and credulity tit no ordinary degree, as
evinced in his earlier work the , Religio Medici," (1633): and the author's
able remaxks on subjection to authority, neglect of inquiry, and the spirit of
credulity as the main sources .of populax and philosophical, error2 are
doubtlesa urged in the true spirit of progress. Though when we look to the
details, we must make much allowunce for the slowness with which progress
manifests Itmelf. We must recognise the ideas of the age in the mrnestness with
which he introduces and denounces m the main source af all errors, the malignity
of the devil, continually engaged in a warfare against truth, obscuring and
misleading men's minds, and propa- Buckle, 11 Hist. of Civilization)" i
334. Vulgar trroftj bk. 1. ch. 5. G 2 Sir 1. Brown& t I - - ----------- *
----------- gating every kind 0 5 on physical and religious point * s, but even
ese deceptions 0 common subjects. And among th 13atan, the most notable are the
practices of magic#' " witchcraft, and the like 1; which by yis agency, me
took for realities. It is sometimes impossible to repress a smile mile the
author's cautious insinuations of possible doubtfulnem in some cases of the most
incredible ab, aurditieg; or at the elaborate learning he brin to bear on them;
as in arguing against the exxii ance of the Griffin and of the PhceniX 2; or his
recondite speculation on the physiology of Ada and Eve.' His remarks on the
possible interpretation of th history of Loes wife and other Scripture miracles
b 'a figurative philology 4 may find their parallel 1, some modem speculations,
though he prudentl concludes, 44 with industry we decline such para ol doxes and
peaceably submit unto the receiv 11 acceptatiQn.19 6 I XTulgar Errors, bk. 1.
CIL 101 9 ibid. bk. v. ch- 65 Ibid. bk. V1. ch- L 2 Ibid. bk. M.'eh- 11, 12. 4
Ibid. bk. Vii. ch- I I - IPMAY L § 11-1 MYSTICISM- 85 Fis profession of
scepticism as to the commonly received antiquity of the earth resolves itself
into InKimt-ing on the falsity of all the ancient traditions of the heathen
nations and the entire discrepancies In the chronology of the Hebrew, Samaritan
and Septuagint versions of the Old Testament, rendering thein all alike unworthy
of cridit. Lastly, not to multiply instances, the author's plaborate discussion
I to illustrate the Divine wisdom in making the sun to move round the earth,
which is fifly ordained to be stationary in the centre, and his itt-veral
arguments in support of the beneficent tit-sign of this arrangement, inight have
afforded a valuable lesson to many modern writers on final mitHes. A singular
exemplification bf the eAent to which mysticism of R. Fludd. j.he contradictory
notion of making faith the basis of ort . ence, was carried about the period of
which we are trvatiDg, may be found in the strange system of It. Fludd (who had
previously been known for some anatomical researches, also curiously connected
with mystical ideas), in which he makes the writings, I Vulgar Errors, bk. A. ch.
5. k 4, 88 HISTORICAL SKETCH. [ESSAY 1. i y were (as might be expected) marked
througho by the peculiarities of his time. His discussio on natural theology,
and his vindication of the stud of "second causes," as in no way
really detractin from the admission of a 11 first cause," are, of cours
earned on in the spirit of that philosophy,, which ha not yet analysed the idea
of causation. He believed the whole universe subservient to th well-being of
man, for whom he says 11 God or' i Ily 'g'na' created, and has vouchsafed by
miracles to alter the course of nature." I While speaking of the Mosaic
narrative, which he regards as designed for a real physical record, he adds, 11
though, that in haosi other places of the Scripture when the works of nature ax
mentioned but incidentally in order to other purposeFi, they are spoken of
rather in a popular than accurate manner, I daxe not peremptorily deny."'i
And in a like tone of extreme caution he insinuates (following Bacon) that the
examination of the book o nature may be valuable for the better understandin of
the volume of revelation. I Usefulness of Exp. Philos. p. 24, 1665. 2 Ibid. p.
29. INGAY I. § U.] ROYAL SOCIETY. so Some illustration of the state of ideas at
the period Naturid and super. now referred to may be collected from the circum-
natund knowleftc mfluices attending the first commencement of the Royal Society~
of which Boyle was one of the f4tinders; inwhose original charter it was
expressly laid down that its object was the advancement of 11 natural knowledge
" understood as opposed to "I supi,ruatural." It was probably
chiefly to satisfy the ptiblic mind on this point that Bishop Sprat (one tof its
earliest raembers) wrote his 11 History of the 61 1 toyal Society " (16 6
7) ; which is in fact simply a lm)l)ular exposition of some of the chief
subjects which Own engaged the researches of its members, to show I liat they
were not followers of occult arts; while in a higlier spirit he enlarges on the
tendency of such Phidies, as eminently favourable to arming the minds tot' their
votaries against the influence of fanaticism And superstition; doubtless aiming
at the morose and ignorant prejudices of the puritanical party, *16ch had so
recently been dominant. I Ik fact the belief in the occult arts was at this
Demoniacal influence. 1w,riod beginning to undergo a gradual process of
ouliversion, at least among the better educated. It isany be worth remarking
that it was in connection i with the subject of witchcraft, that a Dutch
theologian, Bekker (about 1690, in his 11 Monde Enchant6 followed up the denial
of all real power to evil spirits, by extending his speculations to the cases of
Demonia,cs related in the Gospels, and endeavoured to explain them by natural
causes: an attempt afterwards so largely carried out by Semler and the
Rationalists. In Blaise Pascal we must recognise one of the',, brightest
ornaments as well of science as of theology, in the age in which he lived. In
him we find a combination of high and diversified excellence sel om united in
the same individual;-transcendent powers of mathematical and physical
investigation, joined with equally high ability in moral reasoning, clo ed with
glowing eloquence, and all absorbed in a predominating spirit of intense
religious feeling. Of his~ geometry, only some colossal fragments remain; in
physics, the'earliest generalisations of atmospheric a well as hydrostatic
pressure are associated with his name:, while his "Thoughts" (not
published till 1670, some, years after his death) are perhaps the chie monament
of his powers of philosophical and mora, discussion applied to theology, and
made subservie to the defence of the Christian doctrine. PASCAL. 91 In regard to
more positive evidential arguments, whether in regard to natural or revealed
religion, his expressions and mode of reasoning betray some vague- ness. Pascars
belief in miracles appears to have received it powerful support from his
conviction of the miracutons cure of his niece, Madlle. Perier, by the touch Of
the Holy Thorn. Such a faith would be little in wcordance with the modem
evidential distinctions; And we may thus account for some expressions in his
writings which might otherwise be imagined of scepAicid tendency; while his
app~al to the principle of faith, and his avowed preference for the practical
axgiiiiient that it is safer to believe,-axe but in accord- ouice with the
general spirit of the Roman Catholic t1w4)logy. Yet his philosophical mind is
continually eviiicedinremaxkswhich beax a profound examination; as. for example
in the emphatic sentence: "Reason confounds the dogmatists, -nature, the
sceptics." ,ne latter paxt of the 17th century abounded in 81m,cillations
of a mixed physical and metaphysical kind, which in one sense may seem to be
related to advance of the study of natural order, though in Imil it tier they
were rather its hindrances as leading the Speculative systems of the world. 92
HISTORICAI SKETCH. thoughts to conceptions but alien from the legitimate method
of prosecuting it. One of the most ccelebratted, of these speculative theories
was that of the erudite Cudworth ("The Intellectual System of the
Universe,",", 1678), in which, among other metaphysical conce tions of
great abstruseness, he indicated in a very' remarkable manner the increasing
sense of the invariableness of natural order, by introducing what he termed the
principle of "plastic nature," I in order to aocount for the
operations of physical laws without, the continual direct agency of the Deity.
But his, description of this principle is of so confused and mystical a kind,
that it can convey little if any real philosophical meaning. He speaks of the
"reluetance and inaptitude of matter," as if the Deity" had to
contend against it. Other writers appealed to what they termed 11 oc-' casional
causation," as well as various hypotheses, nearly all originating out of
some modifications of the Cartesian philosophy, or rather, perhaps, a kind"
of transition condition between it and the more advanced inductive system, which
soon te I Intell. System, W. 37. EMAY 1. § Ii.) OASSENDI. iiet aside such
speculations, or at least to keep them neparate from all real and exact physical
views. These metaphysical theories did not directly aid in estaWishing any
legitimate generalisation of the laws of inatter, and could lead to no
substantial advancesin the Audy of nature. Yet they should not pass without
notice, especially when taken up, as they were, by such Ine.1i as Gassendi,
Pascal, and others, as indicative of it more enlarged spirit of inquiry and
research than the exclusive devotion, whether to the Aristotelian (or the
Cartesian systems, had hitherto allowed. Gassendi, indeed, in his 11
Institutiones Philoso146w," maintained more purely inductive principles,
and especially attacked the metaphysical principles (it' Wscartes in his 11
Disquisitio Mathematica " (about 1680). Hence some writers have drawn a
distinction Im4ween two great European schools: the metaphy- cal, or Cartesian,
and the mathematical, or that of Qtssendi; and, following this distinction, have
ranked In I lie former sect Leibnitz, and in the latter Newton.
Among the
theories referred to, the abstruse speculations of Spinoza were almost
entirely of a metaphysical kind, and led to an extensive pantheistic
and necessitarian system. Yet, in accordance with existing physical
ideas, he seems to have admitted the supernatural, though he argues that the actual
boundary between it and the natural cannot be determined till the whole extent
of nature shall become known to us [See especially Epist. 23. 1677]; unless, indeed, we interpret this as
a virtual rejection of any such distinction.
General Tendency of
Metaphysical Theories
But, while in a strictly
physical point of view, the theories are of little value,
there is still one featu common to them all; however
metaphysical, how, ever little directly founded on physical inductio, however
hypothetical, however mystical, visionary, evep delusive; yet, they all agree in
this, that th were professedly philosophical theories; they wer designed at
least to be results of the pure exercise reason; and avowedly admitted no other
authori They were intended for generalisatione of concl sions and truths
extending to all nature, and su posed to include the whole system of the wor
They, therefore, would necessarily imply some gone idea (however faulty in its
details or its foundati of universal law and order; and the mere recog tion of
such a principle, lea-~ing nothing either
RIBAY L § IL] MITAPHYSICLL THEORIM. 95 nrbitrary intervention Or to
inexplicable destiny, but professing to conceive everything regulated by law and
explicable by reason, was a recognition of the only true philosophical basis of
all scientific knowIC(I("e, pointing at least to some conception of the 0
twity of all nature.
The
Order of Nature
