By Rev. Baden Powell
Idea of
Cosmos.
A striking instance of some anticipation of more extended ideas may be found in the very earliest phase of Greek philosophy,
when Pythagoras is
stated to have introduced the term Kxxxxs in the sense of "the order of the world"
[
This is distinctly asserted by Plutarch, "De Placitis Philos." ii. 1, and In the
Fragments of Philolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. p. 360. 4 60.
Plato, though he drew a distinction between the celestial world and the
terrestrial, yet seems to apply the term Kxxxxs to the whole; affirming the universe to be
a living being with a soul. (Timaeus, p. 30. B.)
Aristotle maintains the same idea of the "order of the world " under the
same term; though he divides it into super-lunary and sub-lunary. (Meteor. I ii. 1, and
iii. 13.)
According to Philolaus, some of the ancients divided the universe
Into three regions: the highest and outermost Olympus, the region of fire; the next
Cosmos, that of the invariably moving planets the Innermost Uranos, that of
variable
nature, between the earth and the moon ; while the earth itself was called the
"hearth
of the universe" (Stobaeus, i. p. 488.)
Some other philosophers held separate stellar systems, each of which in Itself was
called a Cosmos. (Humboldt, note p. 78, transln 1845.)] and thus doubtless had some distinct perception of the grand idea implied. In this view he was
followed, with less distinctness, by Plato and Aristotle. But, at a later period, the
treatise "De Mundo" (long attributed to Aristotle) contains a nearer approach to
the modern view, defining Cosmos to be "the connected system of all things --- the
order and arrangement of the whole preserved under the gods
and by the gods [Pseudo-Aristot. de Mundo, c11. p.391."].
In this Passage it may be remarked that the reference to divine superintendence is
introduced altogether as a foregone conclusion, and not at all as an inference from the
contemplation of the order of the world.
At a much later period, though the writings of
Cicero bear witness to a similar appreciation of the idea of order in nature, yet we
can only regard it as the expression of a sort of anticipatory vision of that grand
physical application to which we can now appropriate it:--"Est enim admirabilis
quaedam
continuatio, seriesque rerum, ut aliae ex aliis nexae, et omnes inter se
aptae, colligataeque, videantur [ De Nat Deor. 1. 4.]."
No sound inferences of order.
These speculative ideas, beautiful as they are, were little
established on any solid physical basis. From the desultory and scattered character of the ancient discoveries in physical phenomena,
none but partial and restricted conceptions of physical causation could be derived. Hence
there could be no real or substantial unity of science indicative of unity in nature. When
they generalized on causes to the extent of imagining certain powers above nature putting
them in action, it was almost a matter of necessity to suppose a number of distinct,
independent, and conflicting powers.
Final causes as viewed by the ancients.
When they examined organized nature and found structures adapted to purposes, means beautifully fitted
to ends, they could not advance beyond isolated cases, or
combine those structures in one view with any great laws of unity or symmetry.
But further, in the system Of the world in the few
instances wherein they could in any degree assign
mechanical causes, they always seem to have considered them as conveying the idea of fated necessity,
rather than that such indissoluble connection in reason is the very evidence of supreme mind, and this
prepossession has remained in full force in men's
thoughts even to much later times,---derived no doubt
from too exclusive a devotion to the ancient writings,
without the corrective of a thorough study of the
inductive physical philosophy.
Natural
theology
of the
ancients.
The most remarkable discussions of the ancients, as bearing on what we should now call natural theology (as in the beautiful instance of the Socratic argument recorded by Xenophon
[Memorab, lib. 1. c. 4.]),
were restricted to obvious instances of the design manifested in the structure of men and
animals; and in the further application of such conclusions the points of chief interest
were such as bore directly on existing questions, as to worship, and sacrifices, and the
influence
exerted by the gods on nature and on the affairs of men, descending even to the lowest
indications by omens, divinations, and the like [I Mernorab. lib, i c,
1; lib. iv. c. 3, &c.] Indeed in all their discussions on these
subjects we find a large admixture of reference to supernatural influences in physical
events; though in some few instances a glimpse of more enlarged contemplations is opened,
as for instance in the well known Ciceronian discussions, --where Cleanthes, one of
the speakers in the dialogue, is made to sum up under four principal heads all the most
material arguments for the existence of the gods; (1.) Indications of Divine prescience
given in omens and the like: (2.) The beneficial order of the seasons and fruitfulness of
the earth: (3.) Marvels and signs in nature and portents above nature; and (4.) (as he
admits "eamque vel maximam") the order and regularity of the heavenly
motions [2 De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. c. 5.].
This last admission is certainly remarkable, especially as compared with the former
points, and in the existing state of physical knowledge. But upon the whole, even in
these most favorable instances, the
view we obtain of the ancient Theistic argument is
such as to impress us strongly with the fidelity of the
apostolic description, xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx [1 Acts xvii, 22]
"Ye are too superstitious," too much given
to the fear of supernatural beings.
Ancient Theistic views.
Herodotus tells us that the ancient Persians ridiculed the Greeks for their gods with human natures,
and boasted their nobler worship of the elements;
making the heavens their god: " xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
[Herod.]
Anaxagoras appears to have recognized one supreme
intelligence; but perhaps the only more enlarged
and philosophical speculations of this kind in which
the ancients indulged, were either those sublime but
visionary imaginations which characterize the Platonic
mysteries, or else, on the other hand, the doctrine of
the "animus mundi" and the pantheistic or atheistic systems with which we are familiar in their fullest
development, in the Epicurean materialism, so elaborately and beautifully expounded by Lucretius.
When a supreme deity was acknowledged, it was
commonly with little reference to any practical or moral influence. The Platonists held indeed that God was concerned in the affairs of
men; but the Epicureans that he was indifferent to them. The Stoics, we are told, placed
Him "without the universe,
turning about, like a potter, this mass of matter from without, the Platonists within,
abiding, like a pilot, within that which he directs [I Tertullian, 11 Apologia," § 47.]."
Aristotle appears to deny any external agency in the Divinity', and seems to favor
Pantheism [Eth. Nic. vii, 8.]: an idea more distinctly traced in some parts of
Virgil [As (e.g.) in the passages,
Partem divinae mends," etc. Georg. iv. 220
. . . "Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem."--AEn. vi. 726].
The Order of Nature
