By Rev. Baden Powell
Philosophy of Montaigne
Some light is thrown on the state both of
philosophy and of religious belief about the end of the sixteenth century, in the instance of one of the most brilliant and
enlightened writers of the period, by the essays of Montaigne (1580); who,
though professedly a moralist, yet in several places, and especially in his
celebrated defence of Sebonde (from which, as Mr. Hallam. observes, that writer
is chiefly remembered), wanders far from his professed subject, into an almost
unlimited range of observations on topics of natural history, physiology, and
physics, according to the views of his day and the philosophies of the ancients,
with especial reference to the question
of the extent of human knowledge and the powers of human reason, and not
without a bearing on the higher question of religious belief.
Montaigne's
physical views are of course in accordance with the yet unformed ideas of his
age. Thus, as to the system of the world [I Montaigne's
Essays, vol. ii. p. 386. ed. 1793], he remarks that the motion of the
heavenly bodies round the earth was believed for ages, till some of the ancient
philosophers placed the sun immovable in the centre. Of late Copernicus has
revived this theory. "But," he asks, "how do we know that a better may
not in its turn be proposed, as one philosophical system has always been
superseded by another? " And he elsewhere argues that all physical science
is dependent on the senses, which are, after all, continually liable to
deception [Ibid. ii. 417]. He was wholly incompetent to appreciate the grand argument of
physical analogy, which mainly determined the conclusions of Copernicus. He
nevertheless approves of the belief in a plurality of inhabited worlds [Ibid.
ii. 417],
arguing from the universal influence of the Divine beneficence.
Yet his
remarks on our knowledge, or rather ignorance, of the Deity are of the most just
and enlightened kind. He complains [Montaigne's Essays, ii. 311] that human ignorance leads men
presumptuously to prescribe to God, and to argue upon his dealings, as if they
were those of a man: to call some things miraculous and others natural; to
ascribe great events to God [Ibid. ii. 316] as particular interventions, as if smaller events
were not so.
In spite of the reasonableness of these views, we yet observe some
singular inconsistencies, the exponents of the mind of the age, rather than of
the individual. He mentions [Ibid. i. 233] instances of prodigies from ancient writers,
without seeming in the least to discredit them, and dwells in detail upon the
ecclesiastical miracles in entire faith, making it wholly a question of
testimony and authority, without a thought, or a disposition to entertain one,
as to the broad question of the grounds of physical credibility. He appears also
to admit the influence of the stars on human affairs, and other omens and
predictions [Ibid. ii. 186].
Montaigne has been pointed out as one of the earliest modern examples of philosophical
skepticism [See
Buckle's "Hist. of Civilization," vol. i. p. 475]. This, however, must refer rather to general principles than to
avowed views on any particular points of belief in religion, or in the
supernatural generally. The state of physical ideas in his time was not such as
to induce any extended question on points of that nature. His scepticism was
displayed entirely in subjects of other kinds - in moral, literary, and critical
questions. He evinces, indeed, a general distrust of the powers of the human
intellect [Montaigne's Essays, iii, 390], and repeatedly enlarges on its weakness, the diversity and
uncertainty of all opinions, and the impossibility of arriving at a general
consent on any subject. If he allude to some alleged marvels as being merely
fortunate coincidences, believed to be miraculous, under the influence of
particular circumstances and prepossessions, he yet fully submitted to the
dogmas of the Church in all matters of religious belief. In particular, he
regarded with undisguised alarm the innovations of Luther and the reformation,
as setting up human reason and private judgment, which, by natural consequence, he conceived, could end in
nothing but in a "horrible atheism [Montaigne's Essays, ii. 166]."
Skeptical Tendencies
Some, indeed, have doubted the
sincerity of Montaigne in his professions of belief in all the wonders to which
the Church then demanded assent. We have before alluded to the probable
existence of much latent scepticism in the middle ages; and it can hardly be questioned that, at all events, the, whole religious
system of those times, by no very remote consequences, would have a strong
tendency towards encouraging a liberalized kind of belief among the thinking
class;--when religious doctrines were inseparably mixed up with so much of the
marvelous, and when those who reflected at all on the nature and grounds of
their faith would, after all, perceive that the Church by no means demanded a
philosophical conviction, in fact, repudiated the very use of reason, and the
appeal to evidence, and required only an assent of faith, a profession of
obedience to its decrees.
The immense multiplication of miracles in the middle
ages, or rather the continual appeal to the supernatural implied in the whole
religious system then upheld, must naturally have produced the effect of
assimilating all such alleged manifestations to each other, and placing them all
alike, in general estimation, on the same debased level. Amid innumerable
legends all distinction of fact and fiction was lost. No one part could be
questioned more than another. And thus, to the apprehension of those at all
superior to such indiscriminate credulity, an equally indiscriminate incredulity
would be the natural result. The vulgar took all these marvels equally for
truth, the more enlightened for fable; and, as being all alike professedly
essentials of the faith, the whole belief would be conformed to the same
mythical standard.
Reginald Scot: Rejection of Witchcraft.
The belief in witchcraft, and other kindred superstitions, was almost universal in the sixteenth
century. [Of the fearful excesses to which the belief in witchcraft led in the merciless persecution
and execution of innumerable persons accused of it, even down to a much later
period, some striking exemplifications are given in Mr. R. Chambers' interesting volumes "The Domestic Annals of Scotland," 1858.
It has
been remarked by another writer, Mr. Dockeray (Egeria, 1854) that this zeal In
the exposure of witchcraft seems to have supplied in the Protestant Church the
place of the miracles in the Romish--as a triumph over the powers of darkness
evincing divine aid]. Yet in the minds of a few who could reason, some doubts were beginning
to suggest themselves; and though this was perhaps little connected with any
advance of physical knowledge, yet it could not but indicate some progress in
rational and philosophical ideas of the supremacy of nature. Of this a striking
instance is afforded in Reginald Scot, who freely exposed such supernatural
pretensions in his "Discovery of Witchcraft," [See Hallam's "Lit. of Europe,"
ii, 135] 1584, wherein he expressly denied to Satan any power of controlling nature. He even appears to have
advanced further, and has been interpreted as disposed to call in question or
explain away supernatural interposition altogether. The existence of some degree
of scepticism of this kind about the period in question is attested by an
allusion of Shakspeare, which is remarkable, considering the general state of
opinion and tenor of belief in his day:
They say miracles are past, and
we have our philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, things
supernatural and causeless. [All's Well," &c., act ii. sc. 3. In this passage nearly all the
editions place the comma after "things,"--though the original folio has no
stop till the end, --and thus make the sentence contradict itself. The punctuation here adopted, which restores
It to sense, was suggested to me by a friend: but I have since found it in an
edition published by Stockdale, 1790, 8vo].
It has been supposed-by some that this passage is an
allusion to R. Scot: but it may rather be asked, was it not more probably the
comprehensive and philosophical genius of the great poet which anticipated
forms of speculation as yet undeveloped, though possibly floating on the mind of
the age ?
Theories of the World.
The various speculative theories of the world which emanated chiefly from Italian writers in the sixteenth century, as those
of Cesalpin, Telesio, And Jordano Bruno, can perhaps hardly come under the
description of physical philosophy, though they each embrace a sort of general
scheme of the constitution of nature, Their systems were indeed mostly of a very
visionary character. That of Bruno (1680) has perhaps attained most celebrity
from the cruel persecution to which it exposed him. He seems to have maintained a
doctrine differing little from that of Pantheism. In the more properly physical
department he boldly asserted the Copernican system, and upheld a plurality of
inhabited worlds; in these respects more fully evincing a participation in the progress of a
sounder and more substantial philosophy.
If the instances just cited are not
examples of the direct advance of physical science, yet they at least show the
light of the age, such as it was, reflected on physical conceptions, and
exhibiting both the character of such conceptions and their relations to
religious belief, as then entertained.
We now proceed, however, to a period
little advanced in date, but greatly so if measured by scientific progress, --marked by the prophetic declarations of the father of modern inductive
philosophy.
The Order of Nature
